leftish carriage trade who account for most of its circulation, are far more effective arguments for social reform than the earnest and tedious homilies in "The Talk of the Town."
I fear that Mr. Brooks' clear mind and clear style show signs of succumbing to that debilitating influence. Thus, he commonly describes the left-wing street and campus demonstrators of the 1960's, most of them brawny, well-nourished youths in their late teens or early twenties and many of them quite ready to break glass or heads, as "boys and girls," and "kids," and even "children." 3 It is positively embarrassing to see a writer of Mr. Brooks' quality compose such a clich&ridden sentence as this: "Which is worse in a time of national crisis: a young swinger who speculates with his investors' money but pursues high-minded investment policies, or a more conservative codger who keeps his clients in the comfortable blue chip stocks of corporations that fuel the wars and foul the rivers and the air?" There are even inept metaphors: Pyramids do not fall because they become topheavy.r Mr. Brooks' craftsmanship and care are not what they were.
No doubt I am captious because I expect so much more of Mr. Brooks than of common journalists. It is but just to say that most of his tale is well-told, entertaining and instructive, in part because its intrinsic interest is great. His subject is one of history's great orgies of speculation. This variety of mass mania is, of course, about as old as the development of societies in which sizeable numbers of citizens have more money than they can spend on the necessities bf life. Rich Romans outbid each other, often to the tune of millions of sestertii, for citrus tables and murrhine glass." Otherwise sober and hardheaded Dutchmen embarked on a spree of wild speculation in, of all things, flowers in the Tulipomania of 1634. Citruswood, glass, tulip bulbs, even the paintings of Jackson Pollock, have at least some intrinsic value, however slight. Not until the invention and development in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of shares of stock and stock exchanges were men able to speculate in things which frequently had no intrinsic value at all, things whose sole worth lay in the chance that the buyer could find a fool still greater to whom he could sell for a higher price than he himself had paid. That there was a surfeit of such fools 200 years ago is evidenced by the South The most obvious recent parallel to the stock speculation of the Go-Go Years is the Great Bull Market of the 1920's, 9 which produced operators quite as picturesque and prehensile as Mr. Brooks' cast of characters. 10 The Go-Go Years, however, undoubtedly cost a far greater number of investors far more money than the bursting of the bubble 40 years before, for the simple reason that the herd of sheep had multiplied past counting, and the new and improved strain had thicker fleeces. In 1970 there were some 31 million stockholders, whose losses Mr. Brooks plausibly estimates at about $300 billion." The public investors were left sadder, if not wiser, but hardly any of them jumped out of windows. No such cataclysm as the Great Depression of the 'thirties has ensued. All in all, the story is more picaresque comedy than tragedy.
The fact is, of course, that the stock market has always served two purposes. One is the eminently proper one of giving people a place to invest their savings, hopefully in ways that will earn income for the investors, create jobs, and produce more, of the goods and services that people want. This is the aspect which the propaganda of the New York Stock Exchange naturally stresses. The other is that of a gigantic Casino, with branches in every city and hamlet in the land, offering action just as fast and more respectable than that available at Las Vegas or Aqueduct.
The dominance of the Casino avatar in the 'sixties was shown by the emphasis which the speculators put on earnings per share, the "bottom line." What the traditional thrifty investor cares about is divi- 9. The best, or at any rate the most readable, work on the subject is J. GALBRAITH dends, the actual payout to stockholders. What gives a share of stock such intrinsic value as it has is the prospect that its owner will receive, sooner or later, his share of the corporation's actual, and hopefully large, income. But in the Go-Go Years the people who bought Leasco or Electronic Data Systems or National Student Marketing or Equity Funding, or even IBM or Polaroid, cared very little what dividend the stock paid, or whether it paid any dividend at all. Dividends are taxable as income, at rates up to 70 percent; it takes a long time to get rich from dividends. What the stock buyers of the 'sixties wanted, and got for a time, was a rapid increase in the stock's market price, which would enable them to sell it within a short time at much more than they had paid, 12 with the profit taxed as capital gains at a maximum rate of 25 percent.
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The market price, however, was a function of projected earnings. If a company's reported earnings per share had tripled every year for several years, the investors and their advisers projected that trend into the future, and even the hereafter, and bought the stock at perhaps 100 or more times its current earnings. This phenomenon, the magic of the price/earnings ratio, produced the fantastic rises in the market prices of some of the conglomerates, 14 the aggressive acquirers of other companies. The principle of success for conglomerates was, like the wheel and the bow, of magnificent simplicity. Let me give a somewhat oversimplified paradigm. Conglomerate A reports earnings of $2 a share, up from 300 four years ago, on its 1 million outstanding shares. It sells at 50 times earnings, $100. B, a stodgy manufacturing company, also reports earnings of $2 on its 400,000 shares, which is just about the same as its earnings for the past several years. It sells at ten times earnings or $20. A issues 100,000 shares, worth $10 million at the market, in exchange for all of B's stock, and the B stockholders have an instant paper profit of $5 a share. A has outstanding 1.1 million shares but now shows consolidated earnings of $2.8 million-an instant increase of more than 25 percent in earnings per share. If the price/earnings ratio rises or remains constant, the market price of the stock will rise.
As A repeats the process, its reported earnings per share increase by leaps and bounds; the market price soars upward like a rocket. If investors extrapolate the increasing earnings over future years of suc- 14. See generally pp. 150-81. cess, the P/E ratio may itself rise, and for market price the blue sky is the limit. So long, and just so long, as the P/E ratio of A remains high and unglamorous target companies with lower P/E ratios can be found, the conglomerate will enjoy marvelous success. The new discovery produced such astonishing Jonah-swallows-the-whale exhibitions as Leasco's successful ingestion of Reliance Insurance Company (more than four times its size), and its nearly successful effort to engorge the $9 billion Chemical Bank New York Trust Company (more than 22 times its size).' 1 Not -all the rapid rises in earnings, of course, were produced by such a technique. Some, such as those of IBM, Xerox, and Polaroid, were perfectly genuine. In others the galloping earnings were produced by "creative accounting," which some people might call fraud and which Mr. Brooks justly and thoroughly excoriates. 16 National Student Marketing, for example, managed to generate practically all of its reported earnings for 1969 by including the profits of subsidiaries which in fact had not been acquired until after the end of the year. 17 We may hope that some day Mr. Brooks will write the story of Penn Central, whose apparent income for several years preceding its collapse was the result of accounting creativity at least as imaginative and far larger in scale. Penn Central, to select but one example, manufactured nearly $10 million of income in 1968 by purchasing its own bonds on the open market at a deep discount, using cash it could ill spare, and reporting the difference between par and the purchase price as "profit."' 8
The almost perpendicular rise in the price of some stocks naturally produced go-go or. "performance" investment companies which sold their own shares to the public, invested the proceeds in the stock of go-go companies, and thus showed enormous and rapid increases in their own asset value per share. Some of the youthful "gunslingers" who managed the investment portfolios were gifted and lucky gamblers, like Gerald Tsai, whose career is brilliantly described by Mr. painful contrast to the prose he produces when he sticks to his last. Some of it is unintentionally funny, which is unusual for Mr. Brooks -as when he describes with a straight face and every appearance of edification the efforts of the with-it pastorate of Trinity Church to modernize religion, and improve the spiritual state and generally "enrich the lives" of Wall Streeters: The means chosen were rock bands, balloons, peace demonstrations, folk singers, and inadequately clad dancers capering in the sanctuary. 2 6 Mr. Brooks has a keen eye for the unctuous hypocrisy of the old generation of Wall Streeters, who sometimes combined regular prayer and church attendance with sharp and occasionally fraudulent practice. But he does not recognize the hypocrisy in the chic piety of some new Wall Streeters. Thus, the above-mentioned Mr. Mates referred to his youthful staff as "flower children" and refused to buy the stock of corporations producing armaments, cigarettes, or pollutants (few of which, as it happens, were in the go-go class). Mr. Brooks, impressed by so much sanctity, says that Mr. Mates acted "bravely and honorably" 27 when (after suspending redemption of the shares of his mutual fund) he reduced the value at which the Mates Fund carried Omega Equities from $16 to the $3.25 he had paid for it, thereby effecting a corresponding reduction in the redemption price of the Fund's shares (which, however, remained unredeemable). I fail to see either bravery or honor; it seems to me, from Mr. Brooks' account, that Mr. Mates was caught and had no alternative if he wanted to stay in business. When Mr. Mates actually resumed redemptions, he reduced Omega's value on his books to 50 cents.
Similarly, Mr. Brooks accepts at face value the hoary merchants-ofdeath myth that Wall Street thrives on wars and rumors of war and goes into a decline whenever a threat of peace develops 28 -or at least that it did so until the Vietnam War, when it was reformed by Abbie Hoffman and Trinity Church. The historical facts are otherwise. World War I, when capitalists were even more ruthless and predatory than they are now, supplies the most dramatic example: On August 1, 1914, the New York Stock Exchange was hit by such a tidal wave of sell orders that it suspended trading for more than four months. United States was being drawn into the war, a wave of frantic selling produced a volume of more than three million shares 30 -an enormous figure for those days. On December 8, 1941, stock prices declined more than seven percent, equivalent to a drop of about 59 points in the present Dow-Jones average. Stocks dropped approximately six percent at the outbreak of the Korean War. They dropped a little when the Cuban missile crisis developed and rose a little when it ended. The market generally rose during World War II, but probably less because traders anticipated huge corporate profits 3 ' than because of inflation and the related fact that incomes were high and consumer goods scarce. A similar pattern developed during the Korean War, whose effect Mr. Brooks calls "modestly bullish." 32 The truth seems to be that Wall Street dislikes war scares, precisely as it dislikes any variety of uncertainty.
Generally, however, Mr. Brooks gives a very accurate picture of the boom and bust of the late 'sixties and of the influences which produced it. Some of those influences, such as the human urge to get rich quick, are probably ineradicable. Are there cures for other causes of the orgy and the ensuing katzenjammer? The South Sea Bubble produced the Bubble Act of 1720. 33 the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 43 now protect the customers of bankrupt brokers. In the aftermath of the Go-Go Years, reforms of the internal management of the investment industry, including stricter disciplinary procedures and higher standards for entry into the business, are under consideration in Congress. 44 Some evils might be alleviated by outlawing the conflicts of interest which produce them. The functions of broker and investment adviser might be separated, thus reducing the temptation to churn customers' portfolios in order to generate commissions. The record of even the most honest and disinterested portfolio managers, however, is something less than brilliant. It may well be that there is no such thing as an expert adviser on the market: Many knowledgeable lawyers and economists believe that there are only two ways to make money by trading in securities-luck and inside information. 45 There is much evidence that an investor can do quite as well by shutting his eyes and sticking a pin in the list of stocks traded on the Exchange as by consulting the most learned and ex- 
